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Global Migration

A Liberal Overview of Causes, Types, Pros, and Cons

by Bill Kakenmaster ¹

Baraa Hamid, now 22 years old, bears a somewhat innocuous scar “about the size of a quarter” on her back, the product of Syrian military sniper fire targeted at parts of rebel-controlled Aleppo.² After rushing to the nearest hospital and undergoing surgery, Hamid and her family (including her mother, brother, sister-in-law, and five nieces and nephews) fled the city “with nothing but the clothes on their backs” to become some of the more than 100,000 refugees living near the Turkish-Syrian border.³ Now, perhaps more than ever, the importance of understanding global migration has been made explicitly clear. Why do people move from one country to another? When people move from one country to another, where do they typically go, and how are they legally classified? What are the potential benefits and drawbacks of global migration? These are the questions for which this article seeks to provide an introductory answer.

¹ Bill Kakenmaster is a student of international relations at American University’s School of International Service. He is also a Fellow in the School of Public Affairs Peace and Violence Research Lab and is Editor-in-Chief of American University’s undergraduate journal of national and global affairs. Previously, he has been a Fellow in the School of International Service and a visiting student at Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford.

² Kevin Sullivan, "Refuge: Sniper Victim," *The Washington Post* 2013.

³ Ibid.

Furthermore, and before attempting to address these questions, it is important to recognize that this article seeks to provide an overview of the Liberal account of global migration. Several other scholars approach global migration from a more critical perspective. It behooves any academic writing to recognize its own limitations and acknowledge the arguments of critics. To that end, after presenting a Liberal overview of global migration, this paper concludes by critically reflecting on the analytical limitations of the Liberal model of migration, with the intention of postulating future avenues of scholarship.

Causes

Scholars of global migration typically organize its causes into two categories: “push” and “pull” factors. In the first place, push factors refer to the causes of migration that encourage people to leave their country of origin for an undetermined time and destination.⁴ Typically, migration literature assumes an inherent link between the economic conditions of a given country and the migration trends of that country. A 2009 OECD report finds, for instance, that in addition to the empirically observed link between the income differentials of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, income inequality within a migrant-sending country also contributes to migrants’ motivations.⁵ In other words, “migrants will tend to move from poor countries to rich countries (where the economic opportunities are better) and this tendency will increase if the income [and income inequality] gap between countries increases;” and indeed, economic push factors of migration have received widespread attention—both theoretical and empirical—in scholarly literature.⁶ At the same time that migration scholarship has traditionally problematized and subsequently identified the relationship between economic push factors and global migration, emerging studies have expanded the notion of push factors to include political, environmental, social, and cultural factors.

One can conceptualize political instability, natural disasters, high crime rates, discrimination, and persecution of certain groups as push factors that encourage people to leave their countries of origin, but which do not necessarily directly relate to the economic conditions of the migrant-sending country. Even if political problems do not necessarily provide a direct answer to the question of migration, economists have argued that “political stability exacerbates the migration flow [between two countries], with greater instability leading to relatively larger

⁴ European Commission, "Push and Pull Factors of International Migration: A Comparative Report," (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2000), 3; Francesc Ortega and Giovanni Peri, "The Causes and Effects of International Migrations: Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005," (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009), 4.

⁵ Anna di Mattia and Guilhem Cassan, "Migration “Push” Factors in Non-OECD Countries over the Long Term," in *The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2009), 145.

⁶ *Ibid.*; Örn B. Bodvarsson, Nicole B. Simpson, and Chad Sparber, "Migration Theory," in *Handbook of the Economics of International Migration*, ed. Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller (Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland, 2015), 12; Ann P. Bartel, "The Economics of Migration: An Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to the Role of Job Mobility," (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1980); Denise Hare, "'Push' Versus 'Pull' Factors in Migration Outflows and Returns: Determinants of Migration Status and Spell Duration among China's Rural Population," *The Journal of Development Studies* 35, no. 3 (1999).

flows.”⁷ On an intuitive level, the positive relationship between political problems like governmental instability, and migration makes quite a lot of sense. For example, the Nepali Maoist movement, which occurred in 1996 as a result of “general government instability and inefficacy,” ultimately declared a “People’s War” against the monarchy, leading to “violent acts by the Maoists and Nepali government security forces against civilians includ[ing] torture, extra-judicial killings (both discriminate and indiscriminate), bombings, gun fights, abductions, forced conscription, billeting, and taxing.”⁸ Hence, faced with the decision to either stay in Nepal, or leave for an unspecified time and destination, scores of people fled.⁹

Granted, the “choice” to migrate for reasons of persecution, poverty, natural disaster, crime, and so on do not function as non-coercive choices. They do, however, more accurately capture the scope of migration causes beyond the simple economic dimension. Furthermore, political, environmental, and socio-cultural causes of migration overlap with economic causes, helping to explain why certain economic effects exert a greater influence on some segments of a given population compared to others. Kanaiaupuni, for instance, attempts to show the effects of gender discrimination on migration, claiming that, in Mexico, educated women find “few occupational rewards” and choose to emigrate in search of more favorable conditions for gender equality.¹⁰ In a similar sense, Afifi links economically induced migration with environmentally induced migration, claiming that degradation of the natural environment through human activities, resulting in “overgrazing, deforestation, agricultural mismanagement, fuel wood consumption, and urbanization” worsened the Sub-Saharan African agricultural sector, thereby resulting in economic incentives for migration.¹¹ Clearly, then, the distinction between economic and other types of push factors is far from definite, and indeed push factors intersect along gendered, cultural, political, environmental, and economic lines.

If the distinction between different types of push factors is somewhat obscure, then the precise distinction between push factors and pull factors is similarly so. Pull factors refer to those factors which, unlike push factors, encourage someone to leave their country for a specific destination; and these are considered “stronger determinants of migration than push effects” in economic literature.¹² When viewed as diametrically opposed to one another, the assertion that pull factors matter more seems counter-intuitive. How can a marginally better wage in a developed country exert a stronger influence on migration from developing countries than extreme poverty? But conceptualizing migration in terms of a push-pull model, where both factors influence the initial decision to migrate and the migration trajectory itself, reconciles this tension.

Consider the following comparison between three destination regions for Syrian refugees in 2015. As of August 2015, 4.1 million Syrians fled to neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and

⁷ Jose Edgardo L. Campos and Donald Lien, “Political Instability and Illegal Immigration,” *Journal of Population Economics* 8, no. 1 (1995): 23.

⁸ Nathalie Williams and Meeta S. Pradhan, “Political Conflict and Migration: How Has Violence and Political Instability Affected Migration Patterns in Nepal?,” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2009), 7.

⁹ Keshab Prasad Bhattarai, “Armed Conflict and Migration: A Threat for Development and Peace” (Lund University, 2004), 13; Williams and Pradhan.

¹⁰ Shawn Malia Kanaiaupuni, “Reframing the Migration Question: An Analysis of Men, Women, and Gender in Mexico,” *Social Forces* 78, no. 4 (2000): 1337.

¹¹ Tamer Afifi, “Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in Niger,” *International Migration* 49 (2011): e100.

¹² Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 33.

Jordan in light of a brutal civil war that left many destitute, impoverished, and facing persecution.¹³ In contrast, Europe as a whole received only 348,540 asylum applications from Syrian immigrants by the same month.¹⁴ China received nine Syrian refugees and 26 asylum seekers, compared to China's total 795 "persons of concern," or displaced people—between January and August 2015.¹⁵ Japan received 7,586 total asylum applications in 2015, only three of which were filed by Syrians.¹⁶ This example helps explain how, in addition to push factors that caused people to leave Syria, pull factors caused people to leave Syria for a specific destination, whether in the Middle East, Europe, or Asia.

The example of the Syrian refugees further underscores that pull factors exist outside of purely economic motivations. Job opportunities and wage differentials may certainly have played a role in determining the number of asylum applications received by Germany (an "unprecedented 442,000 individual first-time asylum applications in 2015") or Hungary (174,000 applications).¹⁷ Yet such an explanation has comparatively limited use in explaining why so many refugees applied for asylum in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, or Iraq, instead of the economically stronger Europe; or even why so many refugees applied for asylum in Germany instead of the United Kingdom, which has similarly favorable economic conditions. Indeed, other factors such as geographic proximity, cultural-linguistic similarity, liberalized migration policies, lower levels of crime and violence, and political stability all arguably played some role in determining the destinations of many Syrian refugees.

It is in understanding the relationship between the different push and pull factors of migration that we begin to see not just why people *emigrate* from their countries of origin, but also why people *immigrate* to specific destinations. Furthermore, the relationship between economic and non-economic push and pull factors helps refine our theoretical understanding of migration trajectories. Thus, the push-pull model of migration seems a useful tool, and one whose explanatory power can and should be expanded to account for the economic, political, and social factors that cause migration from one part of the world to another.

Types

If, as was just argued, the push-pull model of migration explains several causes of migration, then it also helps explain different types of migration that occur. This section discusses two important factors in classifying different, although not mutually exclusive, types of migration related to both the status of migrants themselves and their directional patterns.

First, international migration law distinguishes between two types of migrants: refugees and other migrants. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, a refugee is someone who,

¹³ Greg Myre, "The Migrant Crisis, by the Numbers," *NPR* 2015. For an individual breakdown of neighboring country data, see: UNHCR, "3rd 2015 Annual Report in Response to the Syria Crisis," (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015), 30-70.

¹⁴ Myre.

¹⁵ Liang Pan, "Why China Isn't Hosting Syrian Refugees," *Foreign Policy* 2016.

¹⁶ Al Jazeera, "Japan Rejected 99 Percent of Refugees in 2015," *Al Jazeera* 2016.

¹⁷ Phillip Connor, "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015: Recent Wave Accounts for About One-in-Ten Asylum Applications since 1985," (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2016), 6.

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.¹⁸

Refugees are thusly understood as a distinct class of migrant who, because of the causes of their migration, are legally entitled to special forms of protection and aid. Detailing what the Convention implies for persecution, what it means by particular social group, or any of the other myriad technicalities related to refugee law is beyond the scope of this paper, and have been extensively covered elsewhere.¹⁹ The important point, however, is that refugees are distinct from other migrants because their migratory patterns “impl[y] a violation of humans rights of particular gravity,” which affords them special legal protection regardless of their adherence to domestic prohibitions on irregular migration.²⁰

Some scholars have challenged the distinction between refugees and other migrants who have been forced out of their countries of origin for non-persecutory reasons. In fact, nesting refugee status within the broader category of forced migration—which itself is nested within the still broader category of migration—represents little more than arbitrarily “distinguishing between persecution and other serious human rights deprivations as [causes] of displacement.”²¹ Critical push factors, such as rapid-onset floods, famine, earthquakes, state fragility, and economic collapse may lead to higher levels of forced migration both domestically and internationally, but the victims of such environmentally, politically, or economically induced displacement do not enjoy legal protection despite the clear injustice involved in repatriating victims of such displacement.²² Thus, as linked to specific push factors, the legal status of migrants differs under the gambit of international law, although the utility of such legalistic distinctions’ is limited and unable to accommodate other forms of forced migration.

At the same time that the push-pull model clarifies distinctions between different types of migrants’ legal statuses, it also can explain certain migratory trajectories across the globe. Global migration can be conceived of consisting of four different macro-trajectories: North-North, North-South, South-North, and South-South, where the first term refers to the origin of migrants and the second terms refers to their destination. In 2013, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs found the following distribution of migration:

- South-South: 82.3 million migrants (36%)
- South-North: 81.9 million migrants (35%)

¹⁸ UN General Assembly, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137-220; UN General Assembly, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267-276.

¹⁹ Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, "The International Law of Refugee Protection," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud, and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross, eds., *Foundations of International Migration Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²⁰ Goodwin-Gill, 39.

²¹ Alexander Betts, *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 5.

²² *Ibid.*, 16-19. Cf. James C. Hathaway, "Is Refugee Status Really Elitist?" in *Europe and Refugees: A Challenge?* ed. Jean Yves Carlier and Dirk Vanheule (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997).

- North-North: 53.7 million migrants (23%)
- North-South: 13.7 million migrants (6%)²³

From this, we can derive two initial insights. First, South-South migration occurs at a similar rate as South-North migration. In other words, nearly the same amount of people moved from one country in the global South to another, as they moved from one country in the global South to a country in the global North. Second, more people moved from one country in the global North to another than they did from a country in the global North to the global South.

To a certain extent, these findings contradict the prevailing economic literature on migration, which argues that when country pairs demonstrate greater differentials in economic conditions, the more favorable economy will see higher immigration rates from the sending country.²⁴ But if countries in the global South demonstrate lower levels of, for example, per capita GDP, employment, and purchasing power, why then do levels of South-South migration occur at similar—and, indeed, slightly higher—rates than South-North migration? We might expect the following distribution under a purely economic framework:

- South-North
- North-North
- South-South
- North-South

However, three explanations help explain why such a distribution does not reflect the reality of global migration trajectories. First, short-term economic costs might prohibit long-term benefits. For instance, the cost of intercontinental transportation far outweighs the cost of intracontinental transportation, thus disallowing some from migrating from the South to the North, or otherwise migrating in a way that privileges intracontinental over intercontinental migration. Second, non-economic considerations manipulate the cost-benefit analysis of migrants. For example, greater cultural-linguistic barriers exist between countries in the global North and global South. If neighboring countries X and Y share the same language and similar cultures, then migrants may find it much easier to move between those countries than between countries on different continents which may not necessarily have a similar language, culture, or both. Third, definitional errors within the North-South distinction obscure variations in economic conditions within the global North and South. According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs,

The term “North” refers to countries or regions traditionally classified for statistical purposes as “developed,” while the term “South” refers to those classified as “developing.” The developed regions include Europe and Northern America plus Australia, New Zealand and Japan. These terms are used for statistical convenience and do not express a judgment about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process.²⁵

²³ Population Division United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "International Migration 2013: Migrants by Origin and Destination," in *Population Facts* (New York: United Nations, 2013).

²⁴ Lant Pritchett, *Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on Global Labor Mobility* (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2006); Mattia and Cassan; Pau Baizán and Amparo González-Ferrer, "What Drives Senegalese Migration to Europe? The Role of Economic Restructuring, Labor Demand, and the Multiplier Effect of Networks," *Demographic Research* 35 (2016).

²⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

However, even within the context of South-South migration, relatively more favorable economic conditions between any two given countries can induce people into migration. Between 2001 and 2012, for instance, the number of Bolivians residing in Argentina increased by 48%, and the numbers of Argentina's Paraguayan and Peruvian immigrants increased even further.²⁶ Moreover, the International Organization for Migration noted that between 2010 and 2011, remittances from Bolivians working in Argentina increased by 7.8%, and that between 2001 and 2011 total remittances sent from Argentina to Bolivia rose from \$107 million to \$1.01 billion.²⁷ Thus, even if North-South differentials in economic conditions outweigh South-South differentials, South-South migration still persists at similar levels due to a variety of factors.

Global migration as an umbrella term refers to several categories of migrants' legal status and directional pattern. Under the gambit of international law, refugee status is a distinct classification that entitles some types of migrants to certain protections not guaranteed to other forced and non-forced migrants. We can further conceptualize different types of migration in terms of their trajectories, such that global migration is organized in terms of North-North, North-South, South-North, and South-South migration. The push-pull model introduced previously helps explain how certain push or pull factors correlate both with different legal classifications of migrants and different migration trajectories.

Potential Pros and Cons of Global Migration

However, to the extent that migration policymakers are concerned not only with explaining why and how migration occurs, but also with the potentially positive or negative implications of global migration, we must consider its pros and cons. Any potential pros and cons of global migration depend heavily on the country being evaluated; of course, the sending country will experience vastly different costs and benefits of migration compared to the receiving country. In fact, migration's impact on real wages, employment, remittances, tax revenues, and a host of economic issues demonstrate variable, and sometimes divergent effects on sending and receiving countries. However, to reiterate a central theme of this paper, the benefits or costs of migration do not simply relate to economic issues. This section considers both the economic and non-economic pros and cons of global migration on sending and receiving countries.

The economic benefits to migrant receiving countries concern three main areas: the labor market, public expenditures, and growth and innovation. First, some studies suggest that migration benefits the labor market because migration increases the total supply of labor available in the receiving economy. A 2014 OECD report found, for example, that the U.S. tertiary educated labor market saw a net gain of about 13.5 million participants between 2000 and 2010, over two million of which were immigrants.²⁸ The report also found that between 2004 and 2014, immigrants accounted for 47% of the increase in the all labor force participation in the United States, and 70% of the increase in Europe.²⁹ Second, migration leads to a higher

²⁶ Damien Cave, "Migrants' New Paths Reshaping Latin America," *New York Times* 2012.

²⁷ Matteo Mandrile, "The South-South Remittance Corridor between Argentina and Bolivia," (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2014), 15.

²⁸ OECD, "Is Migration Good for the Economy?" *Migration Policy Debates* (Paris: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014), 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

average national wage in migrant receiving countries over the long run.³⁰ In this vein, immigrant labor can function as a complement to native-born labor, so that the increase in the overall labor supply actually increases inter-industry value of the marginal productivity of labor. A review of the economic literature on migration conducted by the Brookings Institution showed that, “economists do not tend to find that immigrants cause any sizeable decrease in wages and employment of U.S.-born citizens [...] and instead may raise wages and lower prices in the aggregate.”³¹ For example, “low-skilled immigrant laborers allow U.S.-born farmers, contractors, and craftsmen to expand agricultural production or to build more homes.”³² Comparing these two findings suggests that the majority of migrant-dominated labor force participation is contained in low-skilled employment.

In another vein, however, immigration can also function as a substitute for native-born labor, and some scholars have challenged the assumptions that immigrants contribute mainly to low-skilled labor and positively benefit employment rates for receiving countries. For example, even anti-immigrant think tankers Steven Camarota and Karen Jensenius cite U.S. census data showing that among the total 465 civilian occupations in the United States, only four are comprised of 50% or more immigrants, and only 93 are comprised of 20% or more.³³ Furthermore, Joshua Angrist and Adriana Kugler observe that, among eight European countries, both labor force participation and employment rates, which are a condition of labor force participation, were lower among immigrants than native-born populations.³⁴ Ultimately, whether immigrant labor substitutes for or complements native-born labor in the aggregate is an empirical question. Although, evidence thus far suggests that “migrants rarely substitute directly for native workers. Instead, migrants often complement native workers or accept jobs that natives don’t want or can’t do.”³⁵ David Card, for example, famously found that the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, which practically increased the population of Miami by 7% overnight “had virtually no effect” on the wages or unemployment rates of low-skilled, native-born workers.³⁶ Card suggests this is due either to the ability of native Miamians to leave the city, or to the “growth of industries that utilize relatively unskilled labor” in Miami—industries that grew more rapidly between 1970 and 1980 in high-population cities than in other cities.³⁷ Therefore, the implicit—and, indeed, the sometimes explicit—claim that immigrants destroy the receiving economy by stealing native-born populations’ jobs seems tenuous at best, and immigrants may actually contribute to receiving economies by increasing their total supply of labor.

Beyond just its impact on receiving economies’ labor markets, global migration also inevitably impacts net public expenditures, or the level of government income minus government

³⁰ Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, “Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the Empirics,” *NBER Working Paper No 14188* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008).

³¹ Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, “What Immigration Means for U.S. Employment and Wages,” *Brookings on Job Numbers* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2012).

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Steven A. Camarota and Karen Zeigler, “Jobs Americans Won’t Do? A Detailed Look at Immigrant Employment by Occupation,” (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies, 2009), 1.

³⁴ Joshua D. Angrist and Adriana D. Kugler, “Protective or Counter-Productive? Labour Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives,” *The Economic Journal* 113 (2003): F310; Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr, “Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey,” (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 2011), 8.

³⁵ Amelie F. Constant, *Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers? Migrants Rarely Take Native Workers’ Jobs, and They Boost Employment Effects in the Long Term*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

³⁶ David Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43, no. 2 (1990): 245.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 256.

spending. Fears that migrants and refugees in receiving countries will “pinch the public purse,” so to speak, have grown in recent years, given the Syrian refugee crisis and the myriad other world affairs causing people to move from one place to another at increasing rates.³⁸ Yet at the same time, several studies find that the overall fiscal impact of migration is negligible, only affecting net government revenue by an average factor of between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.³⁹ However, to the extent that public opinion polls consistently cite immigrants’ perceived drain on public services as justification for anti-immigrant positions, we must take the claim seriously and evaluate it.

The greatest factor determining immigrants’ net fiscal impact is employment. In other words, the negligible—and, indeed, sometimes slightly negative—fiscal impact of immigration results from their limited ability to contribute to the public purse, not their abuse or overuse of public services.⁴⁰ Because immigrants have lower rates of employment and labor force participation relative to native-born populations—whether because of employer prejudices or another factor—they cannot contribute as much as native-born populations to government revenue. Employment as a determinant of immigration’s net fiscal contribution is further evidenced by a report from the Institute for the Study of Labor, which finds that “immigration from poor countries [...] represents a net cost to the public purse, while immigration from richer countries [...] generates a net contribution.”⁴¹ In other words, immigrants from countries with lower average rates of high-skilled labor have a slightly negative net fiscal impact, whereas those from countries with comparatively high rates of high-skilled labor have a slightly positive impact. Therefore, the minimal impact that immigration does have on the public purse is due mainly to immigrants’ ability or inability to contribute to government revenue *vis-à-vis* their lower employment and labor participation rates.

Receiving countries also frequently experience brain gain, or increased levels of economic growth and innovation caused by global migration. Although a few high profile historical examples like the contributions of Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr to the Manhattan Project provide evidence in favor of this claim, broad data sets suggest that “brain gain” is a fairly common phenomenon. According to Yale Professor Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, the fact that—for instance—the United States consistently rank among the lowest secondary school scores of math and science among OECD countries, yet among the highest in amount of human capital generated in the natural sciences suggests that the U.S. benefits greatly from immigrant-driven innovation.⁴² A comprehensive review of 2,300 U.S. academic departments of science and engineering between 1973 and 1998 shows that “the marginal effects of foreign and American students are statistically comparable,” and that the marginal benefit of increasing the supply of labor in science and engineering sectors by one worker leads to an additional

³⁸ The Economist, “For Good or Ill: Europe’s New Arrivals Will Probably Dent Public Finances, but Not Wages,” *The Economist* 2016.

³⁹ Robert Rowthorn, “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies,” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24, no. 3 (2008); OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2013* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), 128.

⁴⁰ Uri Dadush, “The Effect of Low-Skilled Labor Migration on the Host Economy,” *Working Paper 1* (Washington: Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, 2014), 16; OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2013*, 129.

⁴¹ Marianne Frank Hansen, Marie Louise Schultz-Nielsen, and Torben Tranæs, “The Impact of Immigrants on Public Finances: A Forecast Analysis for Denmark,” *Discussion Paper No. 8844* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2015), 5.

⁴² Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, “Immigration and Innovation,” *The New York Times* 2013.

approximate 0.9 published academic work per year.⁴³ Importantly, this holds whether that workers is an immigrant or native-born.⁴⁴ Ultimately, global migration potentially benefits receiving countries by (1) expanding its supply of labor, (2) increasing the size of the public purse, and (3) leading to economic growth and innovation.

However, global migration can also have negative consequences for security in two distinct senses. In the first sense, policymakers often perceive global migration to engender both traditional military security threats, as well as other threats to a country's economic, cultural, environmental, or social integrity.⁴⁵ Such policy concerns have nearly no empirical support and, in fact, the Cato Institute recently found the chances of being murdered by a refugee committing a terrorist attack in the United States in any given year to be approximately 1 in 3.64 billion.⁴⁶ At the same time, though, evidence exists to suggest that this perception "signifies the transformation of security from the problem of producing national order to the problem of managing global disorder," and results in increased police and military presence along international borders which in turn results in higher levels of violence committed against migrant and greater levels of insecurity.⁴⁷ Consider, for instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Órban's justification for excluding Middle Eastern refugees, in which he stated that the Hungarian people "do not like the consequences [of] a large number of Muslim people in [their] country."⁴⁸ Subsequently, Hungarian authorities fired tear gas and water cannons to exclude refugees and migrants from crossing the country's Serbian border.⁴⁹ Thus, while some claim that global migration causes insecurity, policy reactions to global migration can create the very insecurity they seek to combat; nonetheless, whether caused by policymakers or migrants, global migration can potentially negatively impact security.

In several ways, sending countries experience benefits and drawbacks on global migration inversely related to those experienced by receiving countries. Sending countries benefit from remittances, temporarily higher wages, and greater employment opportunities in emigrant sectors, but they suffer from a decreased labor supply, loss of high-skilled labor, and disruptions in the age composition of the labor force.⁵⁰ Beyond these economic effects, global migration shifts individuals' political attention from the local to the transnational. Individuals in Mexico, for example, have been shown to be "less politically engaged than their counterparts in towns with a smaller incidence of migration."⁵¹ Furthermore, global migration leads to the

⁴³ Eric T. Stuen, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Keith E. Maskus, "Skilled Immigration and Innovation: Evidence from Enrolment Fluctuations in US Doctoral Programmes," *The Economic Journal* 122, no. 565 (2012): 1146.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Julia Tallmeister, "Is Immigration a Threat to Security?" *E-International Relations* (2013); Bill Kakenmaster, "Migrant Securitization, Policies of Exclusion, and Political Agency: The Construction of Threat in European Policy Discourses," *OCGG Paper No 1* (Oxford: Oxford Council on Good Governance, 2016).

⁴⁶ Alex Nowrasteh, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Risk Analysis," *Policy Analysis No. 798* (Washington: Cato Institute, 2016), 1.

⁴⁷ Michael Humphrey, "Migration, Security and Insecurity," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 34, no. 2 (2013): 180.

⁴⁸ Al Jazeera, "Hungarian Pm: We Don't Want More Muslims," *Al Jazeera* 2015.

⁴⁹ BBC News, "Migrant Crisis: Clashes at Hungary-Serbia Border," *BBC News* 2015.

⁵⁰ Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, eds., *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects* (Washington: World Bank, 2005); Louka T. Katseli, Robert E. B. Lucas, and Theodora Xenogiani, "Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: What Do We Know?," *Working Paper no. 250* (Turin: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006); Beth J. Asch and Courtland Reichmann, eds., *Emigration and Its Effects on the Sending Country* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994).

⁵¹ Devesh Kapur, "Political Effects of International Migration," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 481.

creation of diaspora communities, which can be used to influence voter preferences in the sending country, exert policy influence, facilitate organized crime, and so on.⁵² Perhaps even more importantly, diaspora communities can themselves contribute to increased levels of global migration as emigrants may encourage family and friends to leave their countries of origin.⁵³ No matter its specific effects, though, global migration shifts political concerns in migrant-sending countries from the local to the transnational.

The aggregate effects of global migration on sending and receiving countries are ambiguous. On the whole, migration benefits receiving countries by increasing the available supply of labor, leading to a higher wage equilibrium in the long run, and not draining public expenditures. Migrant-sending countries benefit from increased access to financial capital in the form of remittances, higher wage equilibriums in the short run, and increased employment opportunities in emigrant-dominated sectors. However, potential cons of migration include higher levels of insecurity in receiving countries, and decreased levels of political participation in sending countries.

Conclusion

Global migration stands to present one of the most complex phenomena in contemporary policymaking, the consequences of which bear heavily upon economics, politics, culture, and nearly every other facet of human life. Recall the introductory example of Baraa Hamid who fled Syria with her family as refugees of an intense armed struggle—clearly, global migration and our responses to it carry an enormous impact. This paper sought to provide a brief introduction to the causes, types, and potential pros and cons of global migration. As more than a simply economic phenomenon, global migration's causes relate to a variety of political and cultural push and pull factors. This push-pull model helps explain the different types of migration, both in terms of migrants' legal status as refugees, forced migrants, or otherwise, as well as migration's directional patterns. Any pros and cons identified in social scientific studies of migration will depend on the country under evaluation and also on whether or not the evaluator applies an economic or non-economic lens to the analysis. Although far from a complete review of our knowledge of global migration, this paper offered an overview of the subject in the hopes that, once we begin to understand its nuances and complexities, we can begin to enact positive and substantive social change.

Despite its durability as an analytical framework through which to view global migration, however, the Liberal account has its own limitations, which further scholarship might interrogate. First, the Liberal model is limited by assuming that people migrate under the auspices of the institutions of global order, such as international organizations and market capitalism. It fails to explain in-depth how those institutions arose as relevant forms of power and control in the international system, or how those institutions might contribute to the causes of global migration themselves. In other words, for example, it assumes that people from the global South migrate to places in the global North in order to escape extreme poverty without explaining how individuals are reduced to labor commodities under such a system; it obfuscates how unregulated markets led to such inequality in the first place. Furthermore, this treatment of

⁵² Ibid., 484-85.

⁵³ Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, and Çağlar Özden, "Diasporas," *Journal of Development Economics* 95 (2011).

migrants as labor commodities under a global capitalist system, which ironically lacks a global labor market, ensures that immigrant labor will remain under the province of the informal economy.

Second, the Liberal model of global migration distances observers from their humanity and the humanity of others in both a narrow and a broad sense. In a narrow sense, we become numb to the suffering of which we are constantly reminded, and which is oddly fetishized in the service of guilt-ridden observers who feel compelled to study migration but not offer substantive change to the challenges facing migrants in global society. In a broader sense, it treats migrants as discrete subjects of study rather than as humans—as individuals possessing agency, with the same desire to form global networks through migration—as non-migrants.

Third, the Liberal model explains global migration by conceptualizing countries and groups of people as monolithic. Explaining why, for example, some people migrate from Syria to Germany disregards variation in quality of life within those two countries. Otherwise stated, it ignores the fact that both elites and non-elites migrate from Syria to Germany by abstracting the phenomenon in nation-state terms. In addition, the legal mechanisms with which the global order of migration is constructed further obscure this distinction, so that the international system becomes concerned with phenomena it has the tools to address rather than problems that deserve due consideration but which has no clear solutions. Currently, the public is concerned with the fate of refugees fleeing the Middle East, but no similar consideration has been given to people displaced within their countries of origin, who do not enjoy the same legal protections.

Of course, we should remain vigilant against any one ideology purporting to have all the answers to the current problems of global migration, but we must also remain vigilant against developing a myopic perspective on migration from only one discipline. Future research on global migration could attempt to address its questions through a critical framework by laying out the assumptions of the dominant Liberal account of migration and problematizing their origins and role in structuring and supporting systems of domination and hegemony.

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